However, there is general agreement that brain processes are responsible for consciousness (McGinn, 1989 Searle, 1997) and that finding a perfect match between the contents of the neural and mental states will lead to the discovery of what that process is (McGinn, 1989 Chalmers, 1998). Biochemical, electrophysiological, and systems-level studies of the neuronal activities have not allowed us to cross the chasm of consciousness (Blackmore, 2002). Consciousness is viewed as a hard problem (Chalmers, 1995). Feasibility of this framework to explain various physiological and pathological states of consciousness, its subjective nature and qualia is examined.Ĭonsciousness is described as a biological and therefore, physical feature of certain higher-level nervous systems of humans and a large number of different types of animals (Searle, 1995). According to this framework, a continuum of semblances formed from background sensory stimuli and oscillating neuronal activities serve to maintain consciousness. It is then possible to derive a framework for consciousness as a multi-dimensional semblance. It is based on the formation of semblance of sensory stimulus from (1) synaptic semblances when excitatory postsynaptic potentials arrive at functionally LINKed postsynaptic membranes, and (2) network semblances when these potentials summate to elicit action potential initiating activity in a network of neurons. Based on a proposed synaptic mechanism capable of explaining different forms of memory, we developed a framework for consciousness. Several reports that consciousness is associated with some form of memory imply that different forms of memories have a common feature contributing to consciousness. Binding, a process where different sensations evoked by an item are associated in the nervous system, can be viewed as a process similar to associative learning. Consciousness is seen as a difficult “binding” problem.
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